DePaul Journal of Sports Law
Volume 14
Issue 1 Spring 2018

Article 2

Back to the Binary: How the Olympics Struggle with Separation of
Male and Female
Anna Boyd

Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/jslcp
Part of the Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Anna Boyd, Back to the Binary: How the Olympics Struggle with Separation of Male and Female, 14
DePaul J. Sports L. 1 (2018)

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been
accepted for inclusion in DePaul Journal of Sports Law by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more
information, please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu.

1

DePaul J. of Sports Law, Volume 14, Issue 1

BACK TO THE BINARY:
HOW THE OLYMPICS STRUGGLE WITH SEPARATION OF
MALE AND FEMALE

Anna Boyd*

2

DePaul J. of Sports Law, Volume 14, Issue 1

“[I]t is problematic to impose a binary division on human beings who are far more diverse than the
assumptions behind the labels ‘male’ and ‘female.’” 1
I.

INTRODUCTION

When a woman gets pregnant, the most prevalent question she gets asked is,
“[b]oy or girl?”2 Family and friends celebrate the new arrival of the child with baby
showers and, more recently, gender reveal parties.3 If gender is a black and white
concept (or, rather, blue and pink), then one would expect the separation of male and
female athletes to be a breeze.4 This is simply not the case.5 This comment will
examine the legal rights individuals have when changing, altering, or amending their
legal classification for sex/gender in the context of the Olympics.6
Part II will examine the Olympics’ historical struggle to determine how gender
and sex are verified and classified as well as constitutional issues regarding
discrimination and invasion of privacy.7 Parts III and IV will describe the most recent
athlete, Dutee Chand, who challenged the Olympics’ hyperandrogenism regulations
and her partial success.8 Part V will briefly examine the commonly proposed options
for how the Olympics could split athletes for competition and the legal issues

* B.S. in Chemistry, Villanova University, 2016; J.D., Villanova University Charles Widger School of
Law, 2019; M.B.A., Villanova University School of Business, 2019. I would like to dedicate this article
to those affected by biased rules, regulations, and laws, especially those that exclude nonbinary
individuals. I would like to thank my family, especially my parents, Neil and Victoria, for their
constant support. I would also like to thank my friends at Villanova, who had to hear all about the
writing and editing of this article and probably know more now about the subject matter than I do.
Lastly, I would like to thank God, for without Him none of this would be possible.
1 Erin Buzuvis, Hormone Check: Critique of Olympic Rules on Sex and Gender, 31 WIS. J. L. GENDER &
SOC’Y 29, 29 (pontificating complexities of humans in regards to gender, gender identity, and sex
categories in relation to generally-accepted notions of sport categorization).
2 See Jen Willsea, Please Stop Asking If My Baby Is a Boy or a Girl, HUFFPOST (Jun. 5, 2017, 2:56 PM,
updated Jun. 6, 2017), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/please-stop-asking-if-my-baby-is-aboy-or-a-girl_us_5935a65de4b0cfcda9169b3f (critiquing important of sex before baby is even born).
3 See Martie Sirois, A Word of Caution on Gender Reveal Parties, HUFFPOST (Aug. 8, 2016, 8:38 PM,
updated Aug. 9, 2016) http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/a-word-of-caution-on-gender-revealparties_us_57a8f834e4b08f5371f1d001 (“Gender reveal parties are one of the hottest trends among
today’s expectant parents. They’ve been going on for at least eight years, but in case you aren’t
familiar, gender reveal parties are meant to be exactly what they imply: getting a group of friends
and/or family together with the expectant parents for a party, and “revealing” the baby’s gender at
one time so that everyone present can celebrate the biological sex of the upcoming birth.”).
4 See INT’L OLYMPIC COMM., Olympic Charter (Aug. 2, 2016) (neglecting to define gender or sex within
the International Olympic Committee charter).
5 See Russel Goldman, Here’s a List of 58 Gender Options for Facebook Users, ABC NEWS (Feb. 13, 2014),
http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/2014/02/heres-a-list-of-58-gender-options-for-facebookusers/ (listing fifty-eight different gender options that Facebook users can select when creating a
profile).
6 For a full discussion of legal rights both internationally and in the U.S., see infra notes 53–72 and
accompanying text.
7 For a historical analysis of sex and gender verification in the Olympic Games, see infra notes 73–109
and accompanying text.
8 For a discussion of Dutee Chand’s appeal to the Court of Arbitration for Sport see infra notes 103–
174.
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stemming therefrom.9 The last section of Part V will propose a new approach to
athletic classification in the Olympic arena, consider constitutional issues this proposal
faces, and explain why hormone ranges remain the best option the Olympics
Committee has.10 This last proposal encompasses a dramatic shift toward the
hormone testing of all athletes regardless of sex and rids the Olympics of sex/gender
classification, which best combats the constitutional and legal issues surrounding all
other options available to the Olympic Games.11
II.

BACKGROUND

The Olympics are a time-honored tradition.12 Families from all over the globe
crowd around their televisions every other year to watch as world-renowned athletes
compete for medals in their country’s honor.13 Athletes, however, are funneled into
one of two sex categories when attempting to achieve their goals as a competitor.14
With the rise in acceptance of genders other than the “traditional” male and female
labels, the Olympics have been challenged with competition categories.15
A.

Definitions

In order to have a conversation about gender, sex, and transgender athletes, it
is important to establish the meaning of these words.16 Sex is defined by Black’s Law
Dictionary as “[t]he sum of the peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish
a male from a female organism; gender.”17 This raises the first point of contention,
because sex and gender are not the same; however, it is clear that under the guise of
the law, they are treated equally.18 Black’s Law Dictionary defines gender as the
“difference between men and women based on culturally and socially constructed
mores, politics, and affairs” while many other legal sources use sex and gender
interchangeably.19 Pending lawsuits struggle to find a difference between gender and

For common proposals on how to remedy the sex/gender classification/verification issue, see infra
notes 202–280 and accompanying text.
10 For a new approach regarding athletic categories, see infra notes 256–280 and accompanying text.
11 See infra notes 256–280 and accompanying text.
12 See John J. MacAloon, Double Visions: Olympic Games and American Culture, THE KENYON REVIEW
Vol. 4 No. 1, 98–112 (1982) (describing the prevalence of the Olympics in American culture and
stating all Americans have seen the Olympics at least once).
13 See id. (stating approximately one third of humans alive in 1976 watched the Olympics).
14 See Linda Sheryl Greene, Mirror, Mirror on the Wall – Gender, Olympic Competition and Persistence of the
Feminine Ideal, 31 WIS. J. L. GENDER & SOC’Y 57, 60 (“The [IOC’s] conference produced a document
entitled ‘Women’s Participation in Athletics’ which imposed substantial limitations and noted
distinctions between male and female Olympic competition and provided a basis for the imposition of
limits on those who qualify as female for purposes of Olympic competition.”).
15 See Goldman, supra note 5 (listing fifty-eight different gender options that Facebook users can select
when creating a profile).
16 For the definitions that will control this article see infra notes 17–37 and accompanying text.
17 Sex, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (including as a definition of ‘sex,’ ‘gender’).
18 See Sex, THE MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003) (“Either of the two main form of
individuals that occur in many species and that are distinguished respectively as female or male
especially on the basis of their reproductive organs and structures.”)
19 Gender, BLACK’S supra note 17.
9
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sex.20 Gender, as this article will treat it, is “[t]he behavioral, cultural, or psychological
traits typically associated with one sex.”21 Gender, unlike sex, cannot be determined
based on biological criteria, but is rather defined by a person’s gender identity.22
Gender and sex have been long misunderstood concepts in courts in the U.S.23
Courts have consistently misused terminology and conflated sex and gender into one
concept.24 It is not uncommon for courts to interchangeably use the terms “sex” and
“gender” as well was “transsexual” and “transgender.”25 In addition to conflating the
two terms, courts have referred to individuals as both transsexual and transgender
regardless of whether they have undergone sex reassignment surgery.26 Lastly, courts
have created terms such as “gender non-conformity” instead of referring to individuals
as breaking gender norms and “gender transition” instead of sex reassignment surgery
or simply transition.27 The former is problematic because gender is a chosen
characteristic of an individual, a person cannot be “gender non-conforming.”28 The
latter is problematic because a person can only receive surgery to reassign his or her
sex organs, not his or her gender identity.29
If a person’s biological or assigned sex conflicts with his or her gender identity,
then that person may pursue sex reassignment surgery.30 Even without the sex
reassignment surgery, a person whose gender identity conflicts with his or her assigned
See, e.g., Elise Bloom & Andrew Smith, Does ‘Sex’ in Title IX Include Gender Identity?, THE NAT’L LAW
JOURNAL (Dec. 5, 2016)
http://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/almID/1202773792254/?slreturn=20170922151932
(describing courts’ trouble interpreting sex, gender, gender identity in lawsuits).
21 Gender, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, supra note 18.
22 See Gender identity, NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL., https://www.transequality.org (last
visited Aug. 29, 2017) (defining gender identity as a person’s elected gender)
23 For a discussion regarding how courts in the U.S. have struggled with compartmentalizing sex and
gender as concepts see infra notes 24–29.
24 Compare Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 295 (U.S.D.C. 2008) (characterizing male-to-female
transsexual correctly and offering a definition for gender identity); with Macy v. Holder, 2012 WL
1435995 (E.E.O.C. 2012) (using correct definitions of ‘transgender,’ ‘gender identity,’ and ‘change of
sex’); with Chavez v. Credit Nation Auto Sales, LLC, 641 Fed. App’x. 883, 883 (11th Cir. 2016) (“Sex
discrimination includes discrimination against a transgender person for gender non-conformity”)
(citing Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1316–17 (11th Cir. 2011)) (stating terms such as ‘gender nonconformity’ and ‘gender transition,’ where neither are accurate statements because gender is chosen by
individuals); with Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 830 F.3d 698 (7th Cir. 2016) (referring to ‘gender nonconformity’ and interchangeably using ‘sex’ and ‘gender’).
25 See Chavez, 641 Fed. App’x. at 883 (discussing gender transition instead of sex reassignment
surgery); see also Hively, 830 F.3d 698 (referring to ‘gender non-conformity’ and interchangeably using
‘sex’ and ‘gender’).
26 See generally Chavez, 641 Fed. App’x. at 883 (discussing gender transition instead of sex reassignment
surgery).
27 See id. at 883 (using the term gender non-conformity when referring to stereotyping and gender
norms); see also generally Hively, 830 F.3d 698 (using gender non-conformity).
28 See Chavez, 641 Fed. App’x. at 883 (using the term gender non-conformity when referring to
stereotyping and gender norms); see also generally Hively, 830 F.3d 698 (using gender non-conformity);
for a full discussion on the difference between sex and gender see supra notes 17–22.
29 See Chavez, 641 Fed. App’x. at 883 (using the term gender non-conformity when referring to
stereotyping and gender norms); see also generally Hively, 830 F.3d 698 (using gender non-conformity);
for a full discussion on gender identity versus sex reassignment surgery see infra notes 30–33.
30 See Sex Reassignment Surgery, NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL., supra note 22 (defining sex
reassignment surgery as the process of physically changing one’s biological sex organs to conform
with one’s gender identity).
20
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or biological sex is transgender.31 The process of changing one’s gender expression
(the outward expression or appearance of a person) to conform with one’s gender
identity is called transitioning.32 If an individual decides to pursue sex reassignment
surgery, there is one for each of the sexes.33
When a person does not exhibit any identifying or classifying sexual organs,
he or she is intersex.34 Although an individual may be intersex and may have
ambiguous genitals, many are unaware of their difference in sex development (DSD)
and grow up associating with their predominantly visible sex (whichever sex for which
they develop more characteristic traits).35 Some experts contend that testosterone is
the biological hormone that differentiates males from females, but intersex individuals
with hyperandrogenism and androgen insensitivities “cause[] a person to produce high
levels of hormones” without necessarily absorbing them.36 The measure employed by
the Olympics to determine hormone levels consists of sampling how many nano moles
of testosterone there are per liter of serum in the blood.37
See Transgender, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, supra note 18 (“Of, relating to, or being a person whose gender
identity differs from the sex the person had or was identified as having at birth.”); see also Transgender,
NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL., supra note 22 (using a definition highly comparable to
Merriam-Webster).
32 See Transitioning, NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL., supra note 22 (defining transitioning as a
lifestyle change during which an individual begins to live as his or her gender identity).
33 See Male-to-Female, NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL., supra note 22 (“MTF [male-to-female]:
A person who transitions from ‘male-to-female,’ meaning a person who was assigned male at birth,
but identifies and lives as a female. Also known as a ‘transgender woman.’”); see also Female-to-Male,
NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL., supra note 22 (“FTM [female-to-male]: A person who
transitions from ‘female-to-male,’ meaning a person who was assigned female at birth, but identifies
and lives as a male. Also known as a ‘transgender male.’”)
34 See Intersex, NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL., supra note 22 (“A term used for people who
are born with a reproductive or sexual anatomy and/or chromosome pattern that does not seem to fit
typical definitions of male or female. Intersex conditions are also known as differences of sex
development (DSD).”)
35 See, e.g., Chand v. AFI & IAAF, CAS 2014/A/3759 at 4–5 (Jul. 24, 2015) (stating facts regarding
Dutee Chand’s medical testing leading to discovery of her intersex condition).
36 Hyperandrogenism Explained and What it Means for Athletics, USA TODAY (Aug. 2, 2016, 3:35 AM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/olympics/2016/08/02/hyperandrogenism-explained-andwhat-it-means-for-athletics/87944968/ (explaining that hyperandrogenism presents in many forms
but most common in Olympics regulation is overproduction of testosterone by intersex female
athletes); see Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome, U.S. NAT’L LIBRARY OF MED.,
https://medlineplus.gov/ency/article/001180.htm (last updated Aug. 16, 2017) (“Androgen
insensitivity syndrome (AIS) is when a person who is genetically male (who has one X and one Y
chromosome) is resistant to male hormones (called androgens). As a result, the person has some or all
of the physical traits of a woman, but the genetic makeup of a man.”); see also Testosterone, MERRIAMWEBSTER, supra note 18 (defining testosterone as the sex hormone typically associated with males); for
a full discussion of the impact of testosterone on an athlete’s athletic advantage, see infra notes 92-105
and accompanying text.
37 See, e.g., Chand, CAS 2014/A/3759 (explaining levels of testosterone in “normal” males and females
as well as those present in Dutee Chand and other intersex athletes); see also Ruth Padawer, The
Humiliating Practice of Sex-Testing Female Athletes, THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE (June 28, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/03/magazine/the-humiliating-practice-of-sex-testing-femaleathletes.html (differentiating levels of testosterone in average males and females as opposed to
intersex athletes); see also Grace Carr, Here’s What the 2018 Olympic Gender Regulations Look Like, THE
DAILY CALLER NEWS FOUND. (Jul. 3, 2017, 2:28 PM), http://dailycaller.com/2017/07/03/hereswhat-the-2018-olympic-gender-regulations-look-like/ (differentiating levels of testosterone in average
males and females as opposed to intersex athletes); see also Christie Aschwanden, The Olympics are Still
31
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Emergence of the Issue

A vast majority of sports fans have probably never given a second thought to
gender classifications in the Olympics.38 However, the issue is far more common than
most would suspect.39 A new look at gender classification in the Olympics emerged
over the past few years with Caitlyn Jenner’s transition, Caster Semenya’s triumphant
win of several gold medals at the Rio Olympics, and Dutee Chand’s high-profile case
against the International Association of Athletics Federation (IAAF) and Athletic
Federation of India (AFI).40 Chand, who has gained notoriety over challenging the
IAAF and AFI, was recommended for hormonal testing after a preliminary round of
the Olympics.41 The appeal that Chand filed with the Court of Arbitration for Sport
(CAS) was decided in 2015 and gave the IAAF until 2017 to introduce new evidence.42
The CAS suspended hormonal gender testing unless and until the IAAF could produce
verification that higher testosterone levels gave female athletes an athletic advantage
proportional to the normal male-to-female advantage.43
In response to Chand’s case with the CAS, the International Olympics
Committee (IOC) suspended gender testing for the upcoming South Korea games in

Struggling to Define Gender, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Jun. 28, 2016, 3:24 PM),
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/the-olympics-are-still-struggling-to-define-gender/
(differentiating levels of testosterone in average males and females as opposed to intersex athletes);
for a full discussion on the levels of testosterone accepted for male and female professional athletes,
see infra notes 92–105 and accompanying text.
38 For a discussion on how this issue reemerged in recent years, see infra notes 40–43 and
accompanying text.
39 See, e.g., Greene, supra note 14, at 60–61 (“A stunning female success by Helen Stephens . . . gave
rise to charges that she was a female imposter; an official examined her genitals in order to confirm
her gender.”); see also Buzuvis, supra note 1, at 32 (discussing several instances in which female athletes
were accused of “gender fraud”); see also UNIV. OF MINNESOTA, Rio Olympics Raise New Questions About
Sex-Testing Athletes (Aug. 4, 2016), https://consortium.umn.edu/news/rio-olympics-raise-newquestions-about-sex-testing-athletes (discussing Helen Stephens and Stella Walsh as examples of
females accused of gender fraud).
40 See, e.g., Aschwanden, supra note 37 (discussing Jenner’s view on IOC’s regulations); see generally
Guardian Sport, What is an Intersex Athlete? Explaining the Case of Caster Semenya, THE GUARDIAN (Jul.
29, 2016, 7:13 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2016/jul/29/what-is-an-intersex-athleteexplaining-the-case-of-caster-semenya (detailing Semenya’s case against the IAAF); see generally Chand,
CAS 2014/A/3759.
41 See Buzuvis, supra note 1, at 42–43 (discussing CAS’s use of suspicion-based testing in modern era
as opposed to mandatory testing for all women).
42 See generally Chand, CAS 2014/A/3759 (holding in interim arbitral award that Hyperandrogenism
Regulations are suspended for following two years and that IAAF is permitted to submit further
evidence of hormone advantage during this time).
43 See generally id. (holding partially that IAAF has ability to submit further evidence any time before
July 2017) (holding also that average male-to-female competitive athletic advantage is 10-13% as
opposed to 1-3% advantage for hyperandrogenic women over women without DSDs); for a more
detailed discussion on Chand’s appeal to the CAS, see infra notes 140–161 and accompanying text.
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2018.44 Previously, the IOC adopted the IAAF’s testosterone rule from 2014.45 The
CAS suspended the IAAF’s testosterone rule due to lack of evidence of athletic
advantage for those with higher testosterone levels.46 Further, testosterone levels of
Olympic-level athletes tend to be skewed due to over-training, athleticism, and the use
of performance enhancing drugs.47 Typical females and males have a large separation
of testosterone levels, but Olympic-level athletes tend to have a constant range where
males and females overlap.48 Further, a normal male-to-female athletic advantage is
estimated to be between 10–13%, while there is little to no data to suggest that intersex
female athletes carry this same advantage in relation to women without DSDs.49 In
fact, it is hypothesized that female athletes with hormonal issues only experience a 13% advantage over females that produce an average amount of testosterone and other
hormones.50 Lastly, there is no scientific evidence that testosterone alone accounts for
the advantage between males and females.51 Testosterone is the most highly produced

See generally Chand, CAS 2014/A/3759; see also IOC Consensus Meeting on Sex Reassignment and
Hyperandrogenism November 2015, INT’L OLYMPIC COMMITTEE (Nov. 2015),
https://stillmed.olympic.org/Documents/Commissions_PDFfiles/Medical_commission/201511_ioc_consensus_meeting_on_sex_reassignment_and_hyperandrogenism-en.pdf (stating that IOC
Consensus Meeting recommends IOC suspend IAAF’s Hyperandrogenism Regulations until
resolution of Chand’s appeal or introduction of new evidence by IAAF).
45 See Chand, CAS 2014/A/3759 at 14–25 (listing in detail all of IAAF’s regulations regarding female
athletes, especially those who are intersex and/or those who have hyperandrogenism); see also Robert
W. Luckinbill & Ronald S. Katz, Changing Sex/Gender Roles and Sport, 28 STANFORD LAW & POLICY
REVIEW 215, 232–34 (2017) (describing evolution of IOC’s and IAAF’s regulations regarding
hyperandrogenism as well as IOC’s adoption of IAAF policies).
46 See, e.g., Buzuvis, supra note 1, at 42–43 (explaining that 10 nmol/L is cutoff between men and
women); see also Amanda Schaffer, Gender Games: The Olympics Has a New Way to Test Whether Athletes
Are Men or Women. Is it Fair?, SLATE (Jul. 25, 2012, 7:30 AM) (reviewing a study in which more than
one quarter of Olympic-level male athletes had testosterone levels “below the normal male range”).
47 See, e.g., Robert Wood, Gender Testing at the Olympic Games, TOPEND SPORTS,
http://www.topendsports.com/events/summer/gender-testing.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2017)
(reviewing difficulties when determining cutoff for Olympic-level athletes, as women were typically
below 3 nmol/L, men ranged between 7 and 30 nmol/L).
48 See, e.g., The Associated Press, Naturally High Testosterone Snares Female Athletes in Rio, NBC NEWS
(Aug. 15, 2016, 3:52 PM) (explaining normal females typically have testosterone below 3 nmol/L
while Olympic-level females tend to have higher levels of testosterone, partially due to fact that
Olympic-level female athletes are 140 times more likely to be hyperandrogenic).
49 See, e.g., Buzuvis, supra note 1, at 36–9 (explaining that intersex female athletes and those with
androgen insensitivities are unable to absorb the extra levels of testosterone in their bloodstream,
providing them no advantage similar to males); see also Greene, supra note 14, at 69–80 (differentiating
between endogenous and exogenous testosterone and the absorption abilities of both within the
female body).
50 See Johanna Gretschel, IAAF Releases New Study as it Tries to Reinstate Rules on Testosterone, FLOTRACK
(Jul. 6, 2017) (restating new finding by IAAF that the unabsorbed testosterone provides little to no
advantage for androgen insensitive female athletes, which creates only a 2–4% advantage).
51 See generally Chand, CAS 2014/A/3759 (holding higher levels of testosterone were not proven to give
hyperandrogenic athletes a competitive edge); see also Associated Press, IOC Rules Transgender Athletes
Can Take Part in Olympics Without Surgery, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 24, 2016, 8:04 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2016/jan/25/ioc-rules-transgender-athletes-can-take-part-inolympics-without-surgery (reiterating idea that higher levels of testosterone have not been proven to
give athletes competitive advantage).
44
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androgenic hormone, but it is not the only factor that can produce a difference
between the genders.52
C.

International Legal Gender Recognition

The Olympics, as an international organization, required transgender athletes
to complete sex reassignment surgery before reclassification of gender occurred.53
However, several countries restrict or prohibit sex reassignment surgery.54 In 2012,
there was an international move to recognize transgender individuals without first
requiring the surgeries.55 Argentina was the first country to offer “sex-change surgery
[as] a legal right.”56 Argentina “include[s the procedure] in both public and private
health care plans.”57 Denmark’s Parliament was the first European country to institute
a similar policy to Argentina, which “allow[s] legal gender recognition for transgender
people over the age of 18, solely based on their self-determination – without any
medical intervention.”58 More specifically, countries such as Colombia, Ireland, and
Malta eliminated barriers to legal gender recognition.59 Several countries even legally
recognized a third gender beyond the typical male-female dichotomy.60 In Nepal, the
“third gender category [is recognized] on voter rolls (2010), the federal census (2011),
citizenship documents (2013), and passports (2015).”61 “New Zealand and Australia
now offer the option to have gender listed as ‘unspecified’ on official documents.” 62
See generally Chand, CAS 2014/A/3759 (accepting testosterone as predictive factor of athletic
advantage without scientific proof); see also Myron Genel, MD, Joe Leigh Simpson, MD & Albert de la
Chapelle, MD, PhD, The Olympic Games & Athletic Sex Assignment, THE JAMA NETWORK (Oct. 4,
2016), http://jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?doi=10.1001/jama.2016.11850 (reviewing other types of
congenital mutations that can create competitive advantage).
53 See generally INT’L OLYMPIC COMM., supra note 44 (disbanding Stockholm Consensus that was
approved in 2004 and required transgender athletes to undergo sex reassignment surgery before
eligible competition); for full discussion and description of transgender athlete requirements, see infra
notes 92–99 and accompanying text.
54 See generally Neela Ghoshal & Kyle Knight, Rights in Transition: Making Legal Recognition for Transgender
People a Global Priority, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (2011), https://www.hrw.org/worldreport/2016/rights-in-transition (explaining that some countries have actively enforced laws
disallowing ‘posing’ as the opposite gender including Nigeria, Kuwait, and Malaysia).
55 See, e.g., id. (“[Argentina revised its law in 2012, stating] anyone over the age of 18 can choose their
gender identity, undergo [sex] reassignment and revise official documents without any prior judicial or
medical approval.”).
56 Azadeh Ansari, Transgender Rights: These Countries are Ahead of the U.S., CNN (Feb. 23, 2017, 12:28
PM), http://www.cnotescom/2017/02/23/health/transgender-laws-around-the-world/index.html
(rejecting previous laws to allow for sex reassignment surgery as a right rather than a privilege).
57 Id. (requiring health insurance to allow insured individuals access to sex reassignment surgery).
58 Id. (stating that 34 countries in Europe require medical intervention or a psychiatric diagnosis in
order to obtain changed gender recognition).
59 See Ghoshal & Knight, supra note 54 (detailing Ireland’s identity-based legal gender recognition
system put in place after same-sex marriage referendum passed).
60 See, e.g., id. (including countries such as Pakistan, Bangladesh, and India, who all recognize the third
gender hijras); see also Ansari, supra note 56 (detailing Malta’s, Iran’s, and India’s legal changes).
61 Ghoshal & Knight, supra note 54; see generally Michael Bochenek & Kyle Knight, Establishing a Third
Gender Category in Nepal: Process and Prognosis, 26 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 11 (2012) (explaining history and
current standing of Nepal’s “third gender” laws).
62 Ghoshal & Knight, supra note 54 (describing several countries’ initiatives allowing for third gender
category on official documents).
52
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Canada has joined the movement along with “[a]t least seven countries [that] currently
allow citizens to choose a non-binary option on their passports.”63
D.

U.S. Legal Gender Recognition

The United States leaves issuing new birth certificates and other identification
mostly up to the individual states.64 Of the fifty states, four do not allow for a change
in birth certificate recognition.65 The other forty five states and the District of
Columbia (with the exception of Washington, who remains silent on the issue) will
allow for the issuance of a new birth certificate, but all require that sex reassignment
surgery has been completed.66 There has been a national move toward recognizing
nonbinary individuals, however.67 Oregon was the first state to legally recognize
nonbinary as a gender.68 California’s Governor Jerry Brown recently signed a bill that
will go into effect in 2019 and will legally recognize a third gender.69 California’s Senate
Bill 179 will also provide easier access for individuals changing their on state-issued
documents, which previously required doctor approval.70 The federal government
issues passports with a changed sex classification, but requires a “medical certification
that indicates [a person is] in the process of or ha[s] had appropriate clinical treatment
for gender transition.”71 The federal government, however, does not require that a
person’s “citizenship evidence (e.g. U.S. birth certificate) and ID” match the updated
gender marker on one’s passport.72

Andrew Blake, Third Gender Option Planned for Canadian Passports, THE WASHINGTON TIMES, LLC
(May 5, 2017) http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/may/5/third-gender-option-plannedcanadian-passports/ (describing Canada’s effort to join other international powers to recognize third
gender category on official documents).
64 For a some of the statutes specifying when individuals can change sex classification on birth
certificates, see infra notes 65–66 and accompanying text.
65 See Idaho Code § 39-250 (2005); see K.S.A. § 65-2422c (2009); see In re Estate of Gardiner, 29 Kan.
App. 2d 92 (2001) (overruling administrative rule that allowed birth certificate gender change in
limited circumstances); see Ohio Rev. Code § 3705.15 (2006); see Tenn. Code § 68-3-203(d) (2006).
66 Compare Ala. Code § 22-9A-19(d) (2004); with Ga. Code § 31-10-23(e) (2005); with N.J. Stat. § 26:840.12 (2006); with W. Va. Code § 16-5-25 (2006).
67 See Hazel Cills, California Officially Recognizes Third Gender, JEZEBEL (Oct. 16, 2017)
https://jezebel.com/california-officially-recognizes-third-gender-1819502627 (reporting California’s
move to recognize gender outside of the binary).
68 See id. (detailing history of other U.S. states’ move toward recognizing third gender) (“Last year
Oregon legally recognized ‘nonbinary’ as a gender. This year Washington, D.C. began offering nonbinary drivers licenses, and New York is considering similar legislation . . .”).
69 See id. (explaining Governor’s support to legally recognize third gender option).
70 For a list of states that require sex reassignment surgery or medical approval in order to change
state-issued identification and birth certifications, see supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text.
71 Gender Designation Change, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
https://travel.state.gov/content/passports/en/passports/information/gender.html (last visited Aug.
29, 2017) (underlining omitted); (“[A person’s] physician determines what appropriate clinical
treatment is according to acceptable medical practices, standards and guidelines, and certifies that [a
person] ha[s] had appropriate clinical treatment for gender transition to either male or female. Surgery
is not a requirement to get a U.S. passport.”) (bold lettering omitted).
72 Id. (showcasing federal government’s reliance on genitals as indicator of gender).
63
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History of Olympics’ Gender73 Verification

Women were not always allowed to participate in the Olympics.74 Once
women were allowed to participate, the sports that were open to them were limited.75
Further, a fear developed among athletes that men would pretend to be women so as
to win an Olympic medal more easily.76 This fear became so widespread that officials
took notice and, in 1966, the IOC forced women to participate in naked parades to
verify their genitals.77 Men were excluded from these naked parades because a woman
masquerading as a man would provide her with no athletic benefit or advantage, a
modernly-held belief according to the IAAF and IOC.78 This method of determining
sex left intersex athletes as targets.79
Nude parades also forced the idea that a person’s gender was directly related
to their biological sex.80 Athletes were barred from competing as their gender identity
if it conflicted with their genitals.81 Sex reassignment surgeries during the midtwentieth century were unsafe and rare, which restricted transgender athletes from
competing in the body of their gender identity.82 In fact, there are no records of a
transgender athlete participating in the Olympics while sex reassignment surgery was
For a discussion regarding the differences between sex, gender, and gender identity see supra notes
17–31 and accompanying text; see supra note 53 for reference to transgender athletes being able to
compete without sex reassignment surgery.
74 See, e.g., Buzuvis, supra note 1, at 31 (discussing long and tumultuous history of women gaining
access to athletic competition); see also Greene, supra note 14, at 59 (discussing emergence of women in
sport); see also Laura A. Wackwitz, Verifying the Myth: Olympic Sex Testing and the Category “Woman,” 26
INT’L WOMEN’S STUDIES FORUM 553, 553 (2003) (discussing emergence of women in sport).
75 See Greene, supra note 14, at 60 (“The [IOC’s] conference produced a document entitled ‘Women’s
Participation in Athletics’ which imposed substantial limitations and noted distinctions between male
and female Olympic competition and provided a basis for the imposition of limits on those who
qualify as female for purposes of Olympic competition.”).
76 See, e.g., id. at 60–61 (using Helen Stephens as example of woman whose gender was questioned
based on athletic excellence); see also Buzuvis, supra note 1, at 32 (discussing several instances in which
female athletes were accused of “gender fraud”); see also UNIV. OF MINNESOTA, supra note 39
(discussing Helen Stephens and Stella Walsh as examples of females accused of gender fraud).
77 See, e.g., Greene, supra note 14, at 61 (discussing nude parades initiated by IOC in order to verify sex
of athletes); see also Buzuvis, supra note 1, at 32–33 (discussing nude parades initiated by IOC in order
to verify sex of athletes).
78 See generally Chand, CAS 2014/A/3759 (ruling only women need to be tested for hormone levels).
79 See, e.g., Greene, supra note 14, at 61 (discussing gender suspicion and several instances of female
athletes having ambiguous genitalia); see also Buzuvis, supra note 1, at 32–33 (listing examples of female
athletes attacked for suspicions of gender fraud); for a definition of the term ‘intersex,’ see supra notes
34–37 and accompanying text.
80 For a definition of each and discussion of why these terms are different, see supra notes 16–32 and
accompanying text.
81 For a discussion on how this is changing and the current transgender rules adopted by the IOC, see
infra note 96 and accompanying text.
82 See, e.g., Horatia Harrod, The Tragic True Story Behind the Danish Girl, THE TELEGRAPH (Feb. 28, 2016,
8:30 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/films/2016/04/14/the-tragic-true-story-behind-the-danishgirl/ (outlining the history of first sex reassignment surgery in Germany in 1930 of Einar Wegener to
Lili Elbe, who died one year after completion of surgery); see also The News Letter, Hopkins Hospital: A
History of Sex Reassignment, THE JOHNS HOPKINS NEWS-LETTER (May 1, 2014),
http://www.jhunewsletter.com/2014/05/01/hopkins-hospital-a-history-of-sex-reassignment-76004/
(discussing history of sex reassignment surgery in United States, including first sex reassignment
surgery at U.S. academic institution in 1965).
73
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a requirement.83 A prevailingly modern view, even in the medical community, is that
gender identity and sex organs need not be linked – a person can identify as a female
without having characteristically female genitalia and it makes no difference on her
psyche.84
Nude parades gave way to chromosomal testing due to the emergence of
differences of sex development, such as intersex and androgen insensitivities. 85
Chromosomal testing occurs in the form of a buccal smear, which is an invasive testing
method requiring blood and other body fluid samples.86 The test is designed to detect
the “silent X” chromosome in females.87 If the silent X did not present in the test, it
was assumed that the second chromosome was a Y and that the athlete was a male. 88
Not only did this present issues for intersex athletes, who can develop physically as a
woman but have the chromosomes associated with males (XY), but it also presented
issues for athletes that had other biological mutations.89 Athletes with biological
mutations that caused them to have three chromosomes instead of two failed the
buccal smear and were disqualified from Olympic competition.90 Buccal smears were
replaced with the current method of testing which measures the testosterone hormone
levels of athletes.91
Hormonal testing is an invasive method similar to buccal smears except that it
tests for the nano mole per liter (nmol/L) levels of testosterone within an athlete’s
blood serum.92 The IOC and other sports federations required transgender athletes to
undergo hormone testing; however, only male-to-female transgender athletes were

See Associated Press, supra note 51 (arguing in favor of transgender athletes not requiring sex
reassignment surgery and detailing IOC’s overruling of 2003 regulation that required reassignment
surgery).
84 See The News Letter, supra note 82 (“[Sexual Behavior Consultation Unit] Chair Jon Meyer . . .
concluded that those who had the surgery were not more adjusted to society than those who did not
have the surgery. Meyer told The New York Times . . . ‘My personal feeling is that surgery is not
proper treatment for a psychiatric disorder, and it’s clear to me that these patients have severe
psychological problems that don’t go away following surgery.’”)
85 For definitions of ‘intersex’ and ‘androgen insensitivities,’ see supra notes 34–37 and accompanying
text.
86 See, e.g., Buzuvis, supra note 1, at 32–35 (explaining how buccal smear test and presence of “silent
X” differentiates males from females); see also Greene, supra note 14, at 61–63 (discussing buccal smear
test); see also Wood, supra note 47 (discussing buccal smear test).
87 See, e.g., Buzuvis, supra note 1, at 32–35 (explaining how buccal smear test and presence of “silent
X” differentiates males from females); see also Greene, supra note 14, at 61–63 (discussing buccal smear
test); see also Wood, supra note 47 (discussing buccal smear test).
88See, e.g., Buzuvis, supra note 1, at 32–35 (explaining how buccal smear test and presence of “silent X”
differentiates males from females); see also Greene, supra note 14, at 61–63 (discussing buccal smear
test); see also Wood, supra note 47 (discussing buccal smear test).
89 See, e.g., Buzuvis, supra note 1, at 32–35 (explaining how buccal smear test and presence of “silent
X” differentiates males from females); see also Greene, supra note 14, at 61–63 (discussing buccal smear
test); see also Wood, supra note 47 (discussing buccal smear test).
90 See, e.g., Buzuvis, supra note 1, at 32–35 (explaining how chromosomal combinations of XXY led to
disqualification of athletes despite biological development as female); see also Greene, supra note 14, at
61–63 (discussing buccal smear test); see also Wood, supra note 47 (discussing buccal smear test).
91 See, e.g., INT’L OLYMPIC COMM., supra note 44 (noting IOC’s use of hormonal testing – specifically
testosterone – as current method of gender verification).
92 See, e.g., id. (stating IOC’s cut-off for testosterone level for female athletes as 10 nmol/L).
83
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required to submit to hormone level regulation.93 Female-to-male transgender athletes
were not required to undergo sex reassignment surgery or hormone testing due to the
lack of biological advantage or physical superiority present.94 Male-to-female
transgender athletes were determined to have both physical and biological advantages
over other female athletes and were required to submit to hormonal testing during and
after their transition.95 IOC guidelines in 2015 required any transgender woman to be
legally recognized as such for four years before she could participate as a female in the
Olympic Games.96 Further, her testosterone levels had to remain below 10 nmol/L
before and during competition or she risked being disqualified from both categories
of competition.97
See, e.g., Buzuvis, supra note 1, at 35 (“[T]he policy seems to be concerned only about the transition
of transgender women . . . The fact that this purportedly general policy only makes sense when
applied to transgender women belies its drafters’ biased assumption of the athletic inferiority of natal
females.”).
94 See, e.g., id. at 34–36 (discussing discriminatory nature of hormone testing due to emphasis on maleto-female transgender athletes).
95 See, e.g., id. (discussing disproportionate effect on male-to-female transgender athletes due to
perceived inherent athletic advantage of men)
96
1) Transgender guidelines
A. Since the 2003 Stockholm Consensus on Sex Reassignment in Sports, there has
been a growing recognition of the importance of autonomy of gender identity in
society, as reflected in the laws of many jurisdictions worldwide.
B. There are also, however, jurisdictions where autonomy of gender identity is not
recogni[z]ed in law at all.
C. It is necessary to ensure insofar as possible that trans athletes are not excluded
from the opportunity to participate in sporting competition.
D. The overriding sporting objective is and remains the guarantee of fair
competition. Restrictions on participation are appropriate to the extent that they
are necessary and proportionate to the achievement of that objective.
E. To require surgical anatomical changes as a pre-condition to participation is not
necessary to preserve fair competition and may be inconsistent with developing
legislation and notions of human rights . . .
G. These guidelines are a living document and will be subject to review in light of
any scientific or medical developments . . .
1. Those who transition from female to male are eligible to compete in the male
category without restriction.
2. Those who transition from male to female are eligible to compete in the female
category under the following conditions:
2.1. The athlete has declared that her gender identity is female. The declaration
cannot be changed, for sporting purposes, for a minimum of four years.
2.2. The athlete must demonstrate that her total testosterone level in serum has
been below 10 nmol/L for at least 12 months prior to her first competition (with
the requirement for any longer period to be based on a confidential case-by-case
evaluation, considering whether or not 12 months is a sufficient length of time to
minimize any advantage in
women’s competition).
2.3. The athlete's total testosterone level in serum must remain below 10 nmol/L
throughout the period of desired eligibility to compete in the female category.
2.4. Compliance with these conditions may be monitored by testing. In the event
of non-compliance, the athlete’s eligibility for female competition will be suspended
for 12 months.
INT’L OLYMPIC COMM., supra note 44 (providing explicitly that men are perceived to have
inherent athletic advantage so only male-to-female athletes are subject to regulations).
97 See id. (explaining requirements for transgender athletes to remain eligible).
93
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Hormonal testing raised issues not only for transgender athletes, but for those
with intersex conditions, androgen insensitivities, and other congenital disorders. 98
Intersex athletes and those with androgen insensitivities tend to produce higher levels
of testosterone than other female athletes.99 Hyperandrogenism, which is a congenital
disorder, leads to elevated levels of testosterone due to an androgen insensitivity.100
Hyperandrogenism causes individuals to develop as females but have higher levels of
testosterone, leading many to be unaware of their condition.101 Further, other
congenital disorders can result in increased athletic ability but are not detected by
testosterone regulation.102 There is little to no evidence suggesting that intersex
athletes and those with androgen insensitivities have a competitive advantage over
women that produce less testosterone.103 In fact, an androgen insensitivity inherently
means that that female is unable to absorb the extra testosterone in her blood.104 This
means that a woman with an insensitivity could absorb potentially the same levels of
testosterone as normally-producing women.105
The guidelines proffered by the IOC and the IAAF have been challenged
before by athletes accused of gender fraud or a competitive advantage.106 The most
recent case that resulted in a challenge to the hyperandrogenism rules came in the form
of Dutee Chand’s appeal to the CAS.107 Chand was suspected of having a competitive
advantage based on her exceptional sprinting times and her gait that resembled that of
a male despite her small frame.108 Chand’s appeal was met with the IOC’s suspension
of its hyperandrogenism rules, as well as a recommendation from the IOC Consensus
Meeting to “revert to CAS with arguments and evidence to support the reinstatement
of its hyperandrogenism rules.”109

For definitions of intersex and androgen insensitivity, see supra notes 34–37 and accompanying text.
Id. (defining hyperandrogenism and fact that this DSD inherently results in overproduction of
testosterone).
100 Id. (providing within definition of ‘hyperandrogenism’ that androgen insensitivities result in
overproduction but non-absorption of testosterone).
101 See generally Chand, CAS 2014/A/3759 (describing facts that led to Chand’s appeal as well as how
she was unaware of her hyperandrogenic condition); see infra notes 140–161 and accompanying text
for a discussion of Chand’s legal battle and discussion of how she was unaware of her DSD.
102 Genel, et al, supra note 52 (discussing other congenital mutations that lead to heightened athletic
performance yet do not disqualify athletes from competition).
103 See, e.g., Chand, CAS 2014/A/3759 at 2–5 (differentiating between endogenous and exogenous
testosterone and explaining Chand’s higher levels of testosterone are due to androgen insensitivity –
i.e., hyperandrogenism).
104 See, e.g., id. (differentiating between exogenous testosterone and endogenous testosterone, as one is
naturally occurring within the body and the other is supplied intravenously as a way to ‘dope’).
105 See generally id. (hinting at fact that women with DSDs produce excess testosterone but have a
condition that makes them insensitive to testosterone and other androgens, which means they may
not be absorbing any excess hormones).
106 See generally Guardian Sport, supra note 40 (detailing Semenya’s case against the IAAF).
107 See Chand, CAS 2014/A/3759 at 2–14 (detailing procedural posture of case).
108 Id. (discussing suspicion-based testing and reasons for members of SAI and AFI to suspect Chand
of DSD).
109 INT’L OLYMPIC COMM., supra note 44 (explaining posture and outcome of Chand’s appeal).
98
99
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F.

Legal Issues Raised in CAS
1. Constitutional Issues

The right to privacy in the United States can be found in both the Fourth and
the Fourteenth Amendments.110 The Fourth Amendment right to privacy protects
individuals from warrantless searches and seizures.111 This right was first protected in
Katz where the court found that individual citizens have a reasonable expectation of
privacy against these searches and seizures.112 Since Katz, the Fourth Amendment
protection has moved toward reasonableness of state action.113 This viewpoint was
contested early on in Fourth Amendment progeny in both Terry and Schmerber where
the court focused on dignity and bodily integrity.114 Terry was a stop and frisk case that
aimed to protect against “intrusion upon the sanctity of the person.”115 Although the
Schmerber court did not find a violation of the individual’s right to privacy, the case
centered on a blood sample taken to be used as evidence in an upcoming trial. 116
Regardless of Terry and Schmerber, the court has continued its move toward
reasonableness of state action and away from constitutional liberties typically protected
under the Fourteenth Amendment.117
The Fourteenth Amendment’s right to privacy was founded in Griswold as a
penumbra of the First, Third, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments.118 Roe expanded this
right to privacy and stated that the right was “founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s

110See

generally Elise Holtzman, “I am Cait,” But it’s None of Your Business: The Problem of Invasive
Transgender Policies and a Fourth Amendment Solution, 68 FLA. L. REV. 1943 (2016) (arguing an
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment that would protect invasion of privacy based on more than
unreasonableness of state action).
111 See generally Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (developing Fourth Amendment law as
reasonable expectation of privacy against warrantless searches and seizures rather than protection of
constitutional liberties as under Fourteenth Amendment).
112 See generally id. (limiting Fourth Amendment protection to unreasonableness of state action rather
than extent of bodily invasion); see also Holtzman, supra note 110, at 1956–75 (detailing historical
interpretation of Fourth Amendment and arguing for broader and more modern interpretation so as
to protect transgender individuals).
113 See Holtzman, supra note 110, at 1956–75 (detailing historical interpretation of Fourth Amendment
and arguing for broader and more modern interpretation so as to protect transgender individuals).
114 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (focusing on bodily integrity and dignity of individual citizen in
stop and frisk case); see also Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (holding that use of blood
sample for evidence in trial was not invasion of privacy, though dissent argued for similar Terry bodily
integrity standard); see also Holtzman, supra note 110, at 1956–75 (arguing for broader and more
modern interpretation of Fourth Amendment that encompasses bodily integrity and selective
disclosure standards).
115 Terry, 392 U.S. at 16–17 (employing a standard that focused on the bodily invasion of an individual
and not state reasonableness).
116 See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 767 (holding that use of blood sample for evidence in trial was not
invasion of privacy, though dissent argued for similar Terry bodily integrity standard).
117 See Holtzman, supra note 110, at 1956–75 (detailing historical interpretation of Fourth
Amendment).
118 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that a right to privacy does not exist under
the Fourteenth Amendment literal language but a right to privacy can be found in Due Process Clause
through penumbras of First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments).
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concept of personal liberty.”119 This right to liberty contrasts the Fourth Amendment
right in that it does not actually protect individuals against bodily intrusion. 120
However, Justice Stevens dissented in Cruzan, stating that “[t]he sanctity, and
individual privacy, of the human body is obviously fundamental to liberty.”121
2. Title VII
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 protects individuals from
discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, and religion in the
employment arena.122 Scholars have argued that Title IX of the Education Act of 1972
expands Title VII’s reach to athletic competitions when athletic federations are viewed
as “employers.”123 Assuming that the Olympic Games qualify as an employer to the
athletes that compete, Title VII protects these same athletes from discrimination based
on their sex.124 The seminal case interpreting Title VII is Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.125
That case established that sex discrimination simply means “unlawful . . .
discriminat[ion] against women because they are women and against men because they
are men.”126 Over the years, sex discrimination has expanded to include gender
identity discrimination and sexual orientation discrimination.127
The most recently contested case dealing with the expansion of Title VII is
Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College.128 This case was instituted by a college professor at
a community college in Indiana who had been denied tenure and promotions after
years of working at the school.129 The professor, a lesbian woman with a long-term
partner, sued on the basis of Title VII discrimination and argued that the college
denied her job security and promotions due to her sexual orientation.130 Although
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (pinpointing the exact language in the Fourteenth
Amendment that allows for a right to privacy to exist in the penumbras of the Bill of Rights).
120 See Holtzman, supra note 110, at 1956–75 (comparing and contrasting Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments’ interpretations of ‘right to privacy’).
121 Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 342 (1990) (Stevens, J. dissenting) (arguing
that majority should have used a broader interpretation of Fourteenth Amendment to protect against
bodily invasions typically protected under Fourth Amendment).
122 Title VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et. seq.; see also Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/statutes/titlevii.cfm
(last visited Dec. 19, 2017) (reciting text from statute and giving broad overview of Title VII’s reach
and import).
123 See Kristi L. Schoepfer, Title VII: An Alternative Remedy for Gender Inequity in Intercollegiate Athletics, 11
MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 107 (2000) (arguing that Title VII obviously reaches sports arena due to
universities, colleges, and sports associations being employers).
124 See generally id. (arguing “employers” should be read broadly to encompass sports organizations).
125 See Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984) (dictating standard for sex
discrimination interpretation).
126 Id. at 1085 (holding standard of sex discrimination hinges on the discrimination occurring because
of the discriminated individual’s sex).
127 See generally Hively, 830 F.3d 698 (holding sex discrimination includes sexual orientation
discrimination); see generally also Macy, 2012 WL 1435995 (holding sex discrimination includes gender
identity discrimination).
128 See generally Hively, 830 F.3d 698.
129 See generally id. (arguing lack of promotion and tenure was discrimination).
130 See generally id. (holding sexual orientation typically is not included in sex discrimination but
outcome determinative test can allow for Title VII expansion where changing plaintiff’s sex would not
have resulted in same discrimination).
119
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sexual orientation is not included in the protections of Title VII – only on the basis of
sex is protected – the plaintiff argued that had she been a man, no discrimination
would have occurred.131 This argument has been used as a way to expand Title VII’s
protections to sexual orientation and employs what the court has entitled the outcome
determinative test.132 The majority in the Hively opinion essentially stated that sex
discrimination can occur any time the outcome would change if a person’s sex was
changed.133 For example, when a lesbian professor is fired by a university, the court
should hypothetically change the sex of the discriminated party (here, the professor).134
If the firing occurred because the professor had a wife and was lesbian, changing the
sex of the professor would create a heterosexual relationship and, therefore, no
discrimination.135 The dissent argued that this outcome determinative test should only
change one variable (simply changing the sex of the professor without changing sexual
orientation) rather than two variables (changing both the sex and sexual orientation)
but the majority disagreed.136
Both the traditional Title VII analysis and Hively and its progeny are applicable
to the Olympics’ regulations regarding transgender and hyperandrogenic athletes. 137
The traditional Title VII analysis is applicable to the Hyperandrogenism Regulations
because the Olympics should be, if they are not already, considered an employer for
the sake of discrimination lawsuits.138 Further, although Hively’s expansion and
reasoning may not be necessary in an analysis of the Hyperandrogenism Regulations,
applying Title VII to issues of gender identity and DSDs is a slight expansion of sex
discrimination.139
III.

CHAND V. AFI & IAAF

A.

Background and Precipitating Events

Dutee Chand is an Indian sprinter who rose to fame in 2014 after “she won
gold medals in the women’s 200 met[er] sprint and the women’s 4 x 400 met[er] spring

See generally id. (holding that outcome determinative test means swapping plaintiff’s sex to male so
that she would have been a man married to a woman, therefore resulting in no discrimination).
132 See generally Hively, 830 F.3d 698 (holding sexual orientation discrimination can be determined by
court by using outcome determinative test in which discriminated individual’s sex is changed and
court analyzes whether outcome would have been different under these circumstances).
133 See generally id. (employing outcome determinative test).
134 See generally id. (holding lesbian professor who was fired and refused promotions would have been
promoted and retained as employee if professor’s spouse was a male, thereby failing outcome
determinative test).
135 See generally id. (employing outcome determinative test).
136 See generally id. (holding outcome determinative test expands to sexual orientation specifically by
changing only the sex of the plaintiff without affecting any other variable).
137 For a full discussion regarding the legal impact of Title VII and Hively on the IOC’s
Hyperandrogenism Regulations and Transgender Regulations see infra notes 243–255 and
accompanying text.
138 Schoepfer, supra note 123 (arguing that Title VII obviously reaches sports arena due to universities,
colleges, and sports associations being employers).
139 For a discussion of Title VII as related to the author’s proposal, see infra notes 269–273 and
accompanying text.
131
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relay at the Asian Junior Track and Field Championships [AJTFC].”140 After her race,
because she had previously been an unknown athlete, the IAAF investigated her for
use of prohibited drugs.141 Chand was subject to “a months-long process of medical
scrutiny [and] trips to foreign clinics for batteries of tests” all without knowledge
regarding the purpose of the testing.142 The testing began in June 2014, just one month
after her wins at the AJTFC, and continued until August 2014 when the Sports
Authority of India (SAI) delivered to the AFI all of Chand’s medical records.143 The
SAI determined that “the test results sa[id] she [was] ineligible to compete in the
women’s competition [and] that [her results] indicate[d] she ha[d] excess androgen”
levels.144 The AFI delivered a letter to Chand on August 31, 2014 informing her of
her disqualification and the necessary steps for instatement.145 The AFI, in their letter,
did not address Chand’s right to an appeal or the basis of her suspension. 146 In
response, Chand contacted the Secretary General of the AFI stating that the “high
androgen levels produced by [her] body [are] natural” and that she did “not dope[] or
cheat[].”147 Chand added that in order for her to “follow the IAAF guidelines . . .
attached, [she would] have to undergo medical intervention.”148 The SAI, on the same
day as Chand’s letter to the AFI, also wrote to the AFI reiterating its intended support
of Chand and asking that the AFI support Chand’s appeal to the CAS.149

Chand, CAS 2014/A/3759 at 2 (outlining Chand’s athletic history and success and her quick rise to
fame).
141 See id. at 3–4 (reciting facts necessary to appeal where Director of AFI asked to meet Chand shortly
after 2014 gold medal wins to undergo “routine doping test”).
142 The Associated Press, supra note 48 (finding that suspicion-based testing often leaves athletes
unaware of reason behind medical examination with examiners often stating that tests are being run
for performance enhancing drugs).
143 See Chand, CAS 2014/A/3759 at 6 (following delivery of medical records to AFI Chand was
suspended from further athletic competition).
144 Id. at 7 (“SAI had conducted a test on [the Athlete] for suspected Hyperandrogenism and the tests
were found positive. We have recommended that she be excluded from participation in women’s
events till her hyperandrogen level is brought down to permissible limits.”)
145 See id. at 8 (allowing for reinstatement “in any Competition in athletics” as long as IAAF guidelines
regarding testosterone levels are met).
146 See id. at 7 (detailing AFI’s letters to SAI, suggesting SAI inform Chand of her disqualification and
right to appeal rather than AFI informing athlete).
147 Id. (furthering idea that athletes are told medical examinations are conducted for suspicion of
doping, not DSDs).
148 Chand, CAS 2014/A/3759 at 8 (excerpting Chand’s letter to Secretary General of AFI explaining
that high levels of testosterone were not due to performance enhancing drugs) (“The high androgen
level produced by my body is natural. I have not doped or cheated. If I follow the IAAF guidelines
you have attached, I will have to undergo medical intervention in order to reduce my naturallyproduced androgen level.”).
149 See id. at 8–9 (“The SAI’s letter went on to note that the Athlete ‘has great potential of excelling in
athletics internationally’ and explained that SAI had therefore included her into a training program[] . .
. [and] requested the AFI to support the Athlete’s efforts to resume competing by allowing her to
compete nationally and internationally without asking her to undergo any medical intervention.”
(emphasis omitted)).
140
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Chand v. AFI & IAAF

Chand appealed the AFI’s and the IAAF’s decision to suspend her from
athletic competition in September 2014.150 The appeal went to the CAS, where the
Panel listed four issues that were to be decided:
(a) Do the Hyperandrogenism Regulations discriminate impermissibly
against certain female athletes on the basis of: (i) a natural physical
characteristic; and/or (ii) sex?
(b) Should the Hyperandrogenism Regulations be declared invalid on
the basis that there is insufficient scientific evidence: (i) that
endogenous testosterone improves athletic performance in female
athletes; and/or (ii) that 10 nmol/L is the scientifically correct
threshold at which female athletes are in the “male range” or
endogenous testosterone and therefore enjoy the benefits of male
levels of androgens?
(c) Are the Hyperandrogenism Regulations disproportionate in the
context of: (i) the fact they discriminate on the basis of a natural
physical characteristic and/or sex; and/or (ii) the harm they cause
to female athletes?
(d) Are the Hyperandrogenism Regulations invalid because they are a
form of unauthorised [sic] anti-doping sanction in violations of
Articles 4.3.3, 10 and 23.2.2 of the World Anti-Doping Agency
Code?151
The Panel further noted that the “substantial difference in athletic performance
between elite male athletes and elite female athletes” required a division based on the
sex binary.152 The Panel also conceded that “sex in humans is not simply binary” and
that “[t]here is no single determinant of sex.”153 The Panel also stated its disapproval
of “subject[ing] athletes to gender verification; or to mere examination of external
genitalia; or to chromosomal testing in order to determine eligibility to compete as
women or for the purpose of making a determination about their sex or gender
status.”154 After stating the issues, the accepted factual background, and the
concessions not at issue, the Panel detailed the relevant regulations.155
See id. at 25 (“On 26 September 2014, the Athlete filed her Statement of Appeal with the CAS
Court Office . . . the Athlete nominated Professor Richard H. McLaren as an arbitrator and elected to
proceed in English.”).
151 Id. at 10 (excerpting issues listed by Panel).
152 Id. at 11 (stating that division of male and female is necessary to fair competition as perceived by
IAAF, but Panel will not address any contentions arising from this fact).
153 Id. at 11–12 (“There are people with differences in sexual development (‘DSDs’) who do not
biologically fall neatly into traditional categories of women and men . . . Nevertheless, since there are
separate categories of male and female competition, it is necessary for the IAAF to formulate a basis
for the division . . . for the benefit of the broad class of female athletes.”).
154 Chand, CAS 2014/A/3759 at 12 (departing from long-held traditions and standards of gender
verification and testing in previous years).
155 See id. at 13–25 (including the Olympic Charter, IAAF Constitution, IAAF Regulations Governing
Eligibility of Females with Hyperandrogenism to Compete in Women’s Competition, IAAF
Competition Rules 2014-2015, and The World Anti-Doping Code).
150
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The Panel decision reviewed the evidence presented by both Chand and the
IAAF and their respective expert witnesses.156 Ultimately, the Panel was “unable to
uphold the validity of the [Hyperandrogenism] Regulations. The Panel therefore
suspend[ed] the Hyperandrogenism Regulations for a period of two years.”157 Chand
was reinstated on both a national and international competition level in this interim
two-year period.158 The Panel stated that “[s]pecifically, the IAAF ha[d] not provided
sufficient scientific evidence about the quantitative relationship between enhanced
testosterone levels and improved athletic performance in hyperandrogenic athletes.”159
Lastly, the Panel, although it suspended the Hyperandrogenism Regulations for two
years, allowed the IAAF to file new evidence within this period.160 The Panel stated
that if the IAAF chose not to or could not submit further evidence within the two year
period, the Hyperandrogenism Regulations would be declared void.161
IV.

IAAF’S NEW EVIDENCE

A.

Contested Issues

The IAAF recently came forward with new studies relating to the
Hyperandrogenism Rules that were contested in Chand’s appeal.162 The IAAF remains
steadfast in its determination that the elite female athlete threshold for testosterone
levels should be 10 nmol/L.163 This number has been critiqued and criticized by

See id. at 25–158 (detailing all evidence presented to CAS, including scientific studies, expert
witnesses, and legal arguments).
157 Id. at 158 (“For the reasons explained above, the Panel concludes that the IAAF has not discharged
its onus of establishing that the Hyperandrogenism Regulations are necessary and proportionate to
pursue the legitimate objective of organising [sic] competitive female athletics to ensure fairness in
athletic competition.”).
158 See id. at 160 (holding Hyperandrogenism Regulations were invalid, suspended for two years) (“The
Hyperandrogenism Regulations are suspended for a period of no longer than two years from the date
of this Interim Award. In the interim, Ms. Dutee Chand is permitted to compete in both national and
international-level athletics events.”).
159 Id. (failing to prove hyperandrogenic female athletes confer any significant athletic advantage from
excess testosterone levels) (“In the absence of such evidence, the Panel is unable to conclude that
hyperandrogenic female athletes may enjoy such a significant performance advantage that it is
necessary to exclude them from competing in the female category.”).
160 See Chand, CAS 2014/A/3759 at 160 (allowing IAAF to provide further evidence of testosterone as
providing athletic advantage) (“In the event that the IAAF submits [further] evidence, the Panel will
issue further directions enabling the Athlete to respond to that evidence and listing the matter for a
further hearing for the Panel to consider whether that evidence is sufficient to establish the validity of
the Regulations.”).
161 See id. (“In the event that the IAAF does not file any evidence within that two-year window (or if it
notifies the CAS in writing that it does not intend to file such evidence) then the Hyperandrogenism
Regulations shall be declared void.”).
162 See Stephane Bermon & Pierre-Yves Garnier, Serum Androgen Levels and Their Relation to Performance in
Track and Field: Mass Spectrometry Results from 2127 Observations in Male and Female Elite Athletes, BR. J.
SPORTS MED. (Jul. 12, 2017), http://bjsm.bmj.com/content/early/2017/06/26/bjsports-2017097792 (putting forth new study of Olympic-level athletes including their testosterone ranges).
163 See id. at 6 (concluding that free testosterone in female athletes’ blood serum was unaffected by
athletic event and, therefore, testosterone levels should be closely monitored for women with
hyperandrogenism and higher levels of free testosterone).
156
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several groups of researchers in the past.164 The University of Rochester’s medical
library lists the range of “normal male” testosterone as 9.7 nmol/L and 38.1 nmol/L.165
The same institution lists the range for females as 0.5 to 2.4 nmol/L.166 The Sports
Integrity Initiative compared several studies of testosterone levels, including those
from the University of Rochester, the U.S. National Library on Medicine, BJU
International, and the IAAF.167 The lowest male level found was 6.46 nmol/L and the
highest was 38.76 nmol/L.168 These studies were all conducted with non-athlete males,
as it is generally agreed that elite athletes have higher levels of testosterone.169 While
these studies focused mostly on male levels of testosterone, another study found that
“16.5% of men had low testosterone levels, whereas 13.7% of women had high levels
with complete overlap between the sexes.”170 These studies confirm that the cutoff
the IAAF has chosen for testosterone levels remains contested.171 Further, one of the
main issues Chand raised in her appeal to the CAS focused on the fact that only women
athletes are tested. Therefore, men can fall below this testosterone limit while women
cannot rise above it.172 If it is true that testosterone levels fall on an spectrum even
across the sexes, then any cutoff used to separate the sexes seems arbitrary.173
B.

New IAAF Study

The study was accepted for publication in May 2017 and it studied androgen
concentrations obtained from elite athletes during the 2011 and 2013 IAAF World
See generally Andy Brown, Testosterone is Not Exclusively a Male Hormone, SPORTS INTEGRITY
INITIATIVE (Apr. 20, 2016), http://www.sportsintegrityinitiative.com/testosterone-is-not-exclusivelya-male-hormone/ (compiling data from several scientific sources regarding testosterone in normal
men and women as well as normal ranges for male and women athletes).
165 See id. (providing one example of scientific evidence that conflicts with IAAF’s new study) (“The
US University of Rochester’s online medical library states that the normal ‘male’ range for
testosterone is between 9.7nmol/l and 38.1nmol/l; and between 0.5nmol/l and 2.4nmol/l for
‘females’” (citing John Hanrahan & Rita Sather, Total Testosterone, UNIV. OF ROCHESTER MED. CTR.
(last updated 2017),
https://www.urmc.rochester.edu/encyclopedia/content.aspx?ContentTypeID=167&ContentID=test
osterone_total)).
166 See id. (providing another scientific source differing from IAAF’s new study) (citing Hanrahan &
Sather, supra note 165).
167 See id. (depicting graph with recent medical studies and the ranges of testosterone found in “normal
males”).
168 See id. (depicting graph with “normal male” ranges of testosterone that reach higher and lower than
those stated by the IAAF).
169 See id. (stating on graph that it is generally understood that all elite athletes – male and female –
have higher testosterone levels than non-athletes).
170 ML Healy et. al., Endocrine Profiles in 693 Elite Athletes in the Postcompetition Setting, U.S. NAT’L
LIBRARY OF MED. (Aug. 2014), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/24593684 (providing
evidence that athletes have fluctuating testosterone levels that vary for several reasons – including
overtraining – resulting in a spectrum of testosterone levels instead of discrete categories).
171 See generally id. (providing evidence that spectrum of testosterone means any cut-off will be
arbitrary).
172 See Chand, CAS 2014/A/3759 at 154 (“There is, however, an assumption involved in the
Hyperandrogenism Regulations as a proportionate justification for discriminating between females.”)
(furthering idea that women are inherently less athletic than men).
173 For further discussion on the testosterone spectrum and proposals moving forward, see infra notes
202–280 and accompanying text.
164
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Championships.174 The study details several different events in the sport of track and
field and looks at both male and female competitors for most of the results. 175
However, blatantly missing from the study are the testosterone levels of female
sprinters, the event in which Chand competes.176 Instead, the study simply states that
“male sprinters showed a higher [free testosterone] concentration than the other male
athletes.”177 The study also states that “[f]emale athletes with high [free testosterone]
levels have a significant competitive advantage over those with low [free testosterone]”
levels.178 The study goes on to “conclude[] that despite these higher [free testosterone]
levels in male sprinters, no pattern of advantage from elevated testosterone levels was
found.”179 Instead, the study seems to prove the point that free testosterone (at least
the unabsorbed endogenous testosterone, the kind that Chand and other
hyperandrogenic athletes possess excess levels of) creates “no pattern of advantage . .
. in any of the . . . events.”180
The study further fails to discuss the difference between endogenous and
testosterone.181
Endogenous testosterone is naturally-occurring testosterone
produced by the body.182 It is this free (unabsorbed) testosterone that leads to higher
levels of the hormone in hyperandrogenic athletes.183 Meanwhile, exogenous
testosterone appears in an athlete’s blood serum through doping.184 The study cited
by the IAAF was co-sponsored with the World Anti-Doping Agency.185 Because of
this, it seems odd that the difference in testosterone is not addressed by the
scientists.186
See generally Bermon & Garnier, supra note 162 (relaying data of testosterone ranges in athletes
across several sports within track and field genre).
175 See generally id. (examining most events within track and field except for those in which Chand
competes).
176 See generally id.; see also Andy Brown, IAAF Study Shows Chand Case is Far From Over, SPORTS
INTEGRITY INITIATIVE (Jul. 5, 2017), http://www.sportsintegrityinitiative.com/testosterone-is-notexclusively-a-male-hormone/ (glaring lack of data for Chand’s events) (“Perhaps surprisingly given
Chand’s chosen discipline, the study doesn’t discuss the impact of elevated testosterone on female
sprinters, only male sprinters.”).
177 Bermon & Garnier, supra note 162, at 2 (detailing free testosterone levels for males in different
competition categories without focusing on absorbed levels of hormones).
178 Id. at 1 (neglecting to differentiate between endogenous and exogenous testosterone in blood
serum).
179 Brown, supra note 164 (furthering question of whether free testosterone necessarily links to
heightened athletic advantage).
180 Id. (raising issue of endogenous versus exogenous testosterone, contending that free testosterone
does not have inherent link to absorbed testosterone or athletic advantage); for a discussion of
endogenous testosterone and its effects and relationship to hyperandrogenism and androgen
insensitivities, see supra notes 99–105 and accompanying text.
181 See Chand, CAS 2014/A/3759 at 154 (discussing endogenous testosterone in women giving them a
competitive advantage, where endogenous testosterone is naturally-occurring and exogenous
testosterone is externally-induced).
182 See id. (explaining difference between endogenous and exogenous testosterone and other
hormones).
183 See id. (discussing difference between absorbed and unabsorbed testosterone in body)
184 For the CAS’s contended issues, which address only endogenous testosterone, see supra note 151
and accompanying text.
185 See id. (revealing sponsors of recent study, both of which proffered and supported
Hyperandrogenism Regulations).
186 See generally Bermon & Garnier, supra note 162 (failing to acknowledge difference in exogenous and
endogenous testosterone in elite athletes).
174
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IAAF’s Return to CAS

After publishing its study that concluded female athletes with higher levels of
free testosterone exhibit a competitive advantage over females with lower levels of
free testosterone, the IAAF stated that it plans to return to the CAS.187 The IAAF’s
study stated that “in certain events female athletes with higher testosterone levels can
have a competitive advantage of between 1.8-4.5% over female athletes with lower
testosterone levels.”188 With this new evidence in hand, the IAAF plans to return to
the CAS in order to reinstate the Hyperandrogenism Regulations, which were
suspended through Chand’s first appeal.189 If the IAAF is unable to provide enough
scientific evidence to convince the CAS Panel that the Hyperandrogenism Regulations
are necessary and fair, the Regulations will be void.190 Until the new CAS decision is
issued, Chand will be eligible to participate in all national and international
competitions.191
Upon return to the CAS, it is assumed the IAFF’s main argument will rely on
the “competitive advantage” it found in relation to women with higher levels of free
testosterone.192 However, in the initial appeal that Chand took the CAS, the Panel
noted that a small competitive advantage would not in and of itself make the
Hyperandrogenism Regulation fair.193 The Panel specifically stated that the male
versus female competitive advantage fell around 10-12%.194 Meanwhile, the Panel also
stated that a competitive advantage of merely 1-2% (numbers proposed by Chand’s
expert witness) would not be enough to confer validity on the Regulation.195 The Panel
See IAAF Athletics, Levelling the Playing Field in Female Sport: New Research Published in the British Journal
of Sports Medicine, IAAF (Jul. 3, 2017), https://www.iaaf.org/news/press-release/hyperandrogenismresearch (“The article published today . . . is part of the evidence that the IAAF is preparing for its
return to CAS.”).
188 Id. (restating results from Bermon & Garnier, supra note 162, at 6); see also PTI, Dutee Chand’s
‘Gender Case’ to be Re-Opened, IAAF to Return to CAS, HINDUSTAN TIMES (Jul. 4, 2017),
http://www.hindustantimes.com/other-sports/dutee-chand-s-gender-case-to-be-re-opened-iaaf-toreturn-to-cas/story-vqQ77jYyIECGaJkIksiVTI.html (restating results from recent IAAF study); see
also Brown, supra note 176 (restating results from recent IAAF study).
189 See generally IAAF Athletics, supra note 187.
190 See Chand, CAS 2014/A/3759 at 160 (“In the event that the IAAF does not file any evidence
within that two-year window (or if it notifies the CAS in writing that it does not intend to file such
evidence) then the Hyperandrogenism Regulations shall be declared void.”) (detailing two-year bar
placed on IAAF to bring forward new evidence).
191 See PTI, supra note 188 (“The IAAF, however, made it clear that the Hyperandrogenism
Regulations remain suspended pending the resolution of the CAS proceedings and its decision to
return to the top court of world sports will have no impact on the IAAF World Championships, to be
held in London in August.”) (explaining continued suspension of Hyperandrogenism Regulations
until all CAS decisions have been rendered).
192 See supra notes 187–191 and accompanying text.
193 See Chand, CAS 2014/A/3759 at 155 (showcasing Panel’s reluctance to concede that excess
testosterone causes athletic advantage) (“The evidence does not, for example, establish an advantage
of the order of 12% rather than, say 1% to 3%.”).
194 See id. at 154 (“The Panel accepts the evidence that male athletes have a competitive advantage
over female athletes of the order of 10-12%.”) (accepting that significant advantage could justify
gender categorization for competition).
195 See id. at 155 (“Once the degree of competitive advantage is established, the IAAF would then need
to consider, if the degree of advantage were well below 12%, whether that justified excluding women
187
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remained silent on what competitive advantage would make the Regulation valid, but
the Panel reiterated that it required substantial difference.196 The lack of a substantial
competitive advantage found by the IAAF’s study as well as the fact that endogenous
testosterone is naturally-occurring makes it a likely possibility that the
Hyperandrogenism Regulations will become void after the next Panel decision.197 This
would raise a new difficulty in the IOC’s ability to classify athletes in discrete
categories.198 The IOC has gone through various ways to classify athletes based on
sex, starting with nude parades, then chromosomal testing, and now hormone
testing.199 If the CAS does decide in favor of Chand and other hyperandrogenic
athletes, the IOC would have to determine a new method for classifying the sexes.200
The next section details several testing methods that have been raised as well as a new
proposal.201
V.

PROPOSALS FOR IOC

A.

Gender Identity

Some scholars have suggested that the IOC use athletes’ gender identities as
the separation method in competition.202 This is a progressive view, which suggests
that athleticism should not be dependent upon the sex assigned at one’s birth. 203
Further, it allows athletes to be autonomous in their gender identity which is validated
when an international athletics body recognizes the intricacies of gender as a
concept.204 Lastly, some have contended that because the IOC disbanded the sex
reassignment requirement for transgender athletes that some athletes would abuse this
method of determining competition categories by changing their legal gender without

with that advantage from the female category.”) (giving reasons why separate male and female
categories are justified based on athletic advantage).
196 See id. (denying IAAF’s arguments based on lack of evidence and correlation between increased
testosterone and competitive advantage) (“However, the evidence does not go so far as to equate, or
correlate, the levels of testosterone in females with a percentage increase in competitive advantage.”).
197 See id. at 155 (requiring a higher level of advantage in order to justify Hyperandrogenism
Regulations) (“The evidence does not, for example, establish an advantage of the order of 12% rather
than, say 1% to 3%.”).
198 See infra notes 199–280 and accompanying text.
199 See supra notes 74–109 and accompanying text.
200 See infra notes 201–280 and accompanying text.
201 See infra notes 202–280 and accompanying text.
202 See INT’L OLYMPIC COMM., supra note 44 (“To require surgical anatomical changes as a precondition to participation is not necessary to preserve fair competition and may be consistent with
developing legislation and notions of human rights.”) (supporting idea that athletes need not undergo
sex reassignment surgery in order to compete as one’s gender identity even if it conflicts with sex
assigned at birth).
203 See generally id. (“The overriding sporting objective is and remains the guarantee of fair competition.
Restrictions on participation are appropriate to the extent that they are necessary and proportionate to
the achievement of that objective.”) (explaining why restrictions and testosterone testing must exist
even though sex reassignment surgery is no longer required).
204 For a discussion on gender and gender identity as concepts, see supra notes 21–31 and
accompanying text.
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sex reassignment surgery.205 This contention is highly speculative and lacks
understanding of gender identity.206
This method presents several legal hurdles for the international and the U.S.
community of athletes.207 First, some countries either do not allow gender
reassignment or make the process difficult.208 Second, even if the IOC does not
require sex reassignment surgery, all of the states in the U.S. require sex reassignment
surgery before gender reassignment on identification cards.209 This presents an issue
for the IOC because an athlete wanting to compete under a different sex must first be
legally recognized in order to be classified for Olympic competition.210 In order to
overcome the present legal issues both in the U.S. and internationally, the IOC would
need to revise its current competition procedure.211 The IOC would need to disregard
all gender identification requirements currently in place and allow athletes to simply
state their gender.212 Issues could arise under this honor policy and its mere
implementation would be costly, progressive, and time-consuming.213
B.

Other Hormones

Chand and her expert witnesses suggested in the CAS Panel’s interim decision
that testosterone was not a determinative factor when considering competitive
advantage in athletes.214 Testosterone, they suggested, is not determinative because
See Buzuvis, supra note 1, at 34–36 (detailing Stockholm Consensus adopted by IOC in 2004
requiring transgender athletes to undergo sex reassignment surgery, legal recognition as opposite
gender, and sufficient hormone therapy before competition) (“These unnecessary restrictions may
contribute to the fact that despite the adoption of the Stockholm Consensus by many international
sport federations . . . no transgender athletes have competed in the Olympics pursuant to this
policy.”); see also INT’L OLYMPIC COMM., supra note 44 (disbanding previous Stockholm Consensus in
favor of new regulations governing hyperandrogenic and transgender athletes).
206 See Buzuvis, supra note 1, at 34–36 (discussing criticisms of Stockholm Consensus including
disproportionate implications on transgender women, imposition of Consensus as ‘sincerity test’ to
‘gender fraud’); for a discussion on gender and gender identity as concepts, see supra notes 21–31 and
accompanying text.
207 For a discussion of international laws regarding gender identity and the United States’ approach to
the same, see supra notes 53–72 and accompanying text.
208 For a discussion of international laws regarding gender identity and the United States’ approach to
the same, see supra notes 53–72 and accompanying text.
209 See id. (describing laws nationally and internationally with a majority of countries and states
requiring sex reassignment surgery before gender reassignment, with the very recent exception of
California).
210 See INT’L OLYMPIC COMM., supra note 44 (providing as one requirement for competition that an
athlete’s gender identity be legally recognized).
211 See id. (listing requirements for athletes that want to compete under different gender identity than
current identification); for a discussion of international laws regarding gender identity and the United
States’ approach to the same, see supra notes 53–72 and accompanying text (providing countries and
states that would pose an issue to IOC changing its policy).
212 See INT’L OLYMPIC COMM., supra note 44 (requiring legally recognized gender as bar to
competition, IOC would need to revise this regulation); see also Buzuvis, supra note 1, at 49–54
(presenting issues regarding uniform gender identity rule and IOC’s unwillingness to accept athlete’s
gender identity as anything other than plot to compete in ‘easier’ competition category).
213 See Buzuvis, supra note 1, at 34–36 (detailing IOC’s acceptance of Stockholm Consensus and
required sex reassignment surgery in previous years as ‘sincerity test’ to weed out gender fraudsters).
214 See Chand, CAS 2014/A/3759 at 155 (rejecting Chand’s position and determining that testosterone
is, in fact, dispositive predictor of competitive advantage).
205
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not all testosterone that naturally occurs in a person’s body is necessarily absorbed. 215
Hyperandrogenic and androgen sensitive individuals typically overproduce
testosterone without absorbing it and feeling its effects.216 Other hormones, such as
androgens, are more determinative when considering athletic advantage.217
Androgens, Chand contended, are more proportional to absorbed testosterone levels
and, therefore, do not correspond to free, unabsorbed testosterone.218 While this
suggestion is not scientifically proven as of yet, it could be a way for the IOC to
maintain suspicion-based hormone testing with a hormone that actually confers a
competitive advantage.219 Further, it should be noted that even testosterone’s effects
on an athlete’s athletic advantage has not been proven.220
While this proposal moves to be a conciliatory step in the right direction, it
would not eliminate suspicion-based testing or invasive testing procedures.221
Acceptance of this proposal would concede that hormone testing is an objective
measure of athletic performance and advantage.222 Some scholars remain steadfast in
their belief that hormones vary vastly among men and women and no hormone test
will properly identify an athlete’s athletic advantage.223 Instead, body mass, muscle
mass, oxygen usage and other indicators of athletic advantages should be the measure
employed by the IOC.224
C.

Legal Issues Surrounding First Two Proposals

The first two proposals pose legal issues that the CAS refused to consider.225
These issues included invasion of privacy through invasive testing methods,
See id. (“The Panel has accepted testosterone is the best indicator of performance difference
between male and female athletes.”).
216 See supra notes 181–186 and accompanying text.
217 See Dr. James Simon, Androgen, HEALTHY WOMEN (last updated 2017),
http://www.healthywomen.org/condition/androgen (“[R]esults from blood tests are often misleading
and may not be conclusive because there is no agreement on just what constitutes ‘normal’ androgen
levels in women . . . Further, many standard laboratory tests, optimized for measuring testosterone in
men, may not be sensitive enough to accurately measure women’s levels.”).
218 See generally Mayo Clinic, Testosterone, Total and Free, Serum, MAYO CLINIC MED. LAB. (last updated
2017), https://www.mayomedicallaboratories.com/test-catalog/Clinical+and+Interpretive/8508
(discussing free testosterone and its relation to absorbed testosterone levels, as well as high levels of
testosterone when sex hormone binding serum concentration remains constant).
219 See generally id. (allowing for continuation of suspicion-based testing while negating testosterone as
accepted hormone).
220 See Chand, CAS 2014/A/3759 at 160 (failing to prove hyperandrogenic female athletes confer any
significant athletic advantage from excess testosterone levels) (“In the absence of such evidence, the
Panel is unable to conclude that hyperandrogenic female athletes may enjoy such a significant
performance advantage that it is necessary to exclude them from competing in the female category.”).
221 See Buzuvis, supra note 1, at 42–43 (discussing CAS’s, IOC’s, IAAF’s practice of suspicion-based
testing).
222 See generally Bermon & Garnier, supra note 162 (relying on testosterone as hormonal marker of
competitive advantage in Olympic-level athletes).
223 For a full discussion regarding the conflicting scientific sources studying testosterone levels in men
and women see supra notes 162–201 and accompanying text.
224 See Genel, et al, supra note 52 (reviewing other types of congenital mutations that can create
competitive advantage).
225 For a discussion of the legal barriers posed by the first proposal see supra notes 207–213 and
accompanying text.
215
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disproportionate effect on women by use of suspicion-based testing, and
discriminatory effects on women due to transgender policies only affecting
transgender women and hyperandrogenic rules only affecting women with DSDs.226
1. Invasion of Privacy
Some scholars have argued that the Fourth Amendment was historically
intended to protect citizens from invasion of bodily contact.227 Although the doctrine
has been interpreted as reasonableness of state power rather than constitutional
liberties, one scholar has argued for a change in Fourth Amendment interpretation.228
Under Terry and Schmerber, which both focus on dignity and bodily integrity, the
invasive testing of the IOC would violate constitutional protections in the U.S.229
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, the right to privacy is less about actual bodily
invasion and more about a right against state intervention.230 The right to privacy
initially founded under Griswold and Roe would likely not protect athletes from invasive
testing.231 However, Stevens’ dissent in Cruzan focused on “[t]he sanctity, and
individual privacy, of the human body” which “is obviously fundamental to liberty.”232
Stevens’ interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment would protect athletes from the
invasive testing method used by the IOC and endorsed by the CAS.233 Stevens’ dissent
protects the dignity of each human body and merges the two lines of interpretation
regarding “invasion of privacy,” which seems to be the Constitution’s intent.234

See Buzuvis, supra note 1, at 40–44 (discussing CAS’s endorsement of IOC’s suspicion-based
testing and testosterone-based categories); see generally Chand, CAS 2014/A/3759 (holding by CAS
Panel allowing for hormone testing with testosterone as indicator of athletic advantage and suspicionbased testing).
227 See generally Holtzman, supra note 110 (arguing for expansion of Fourth Amendment protection);
for a full discussion of the history of the Fourth Amendment and Holtzman’s argument for expansion
see supra notes 110–117 and accompanying text.
228 See generally Holtzman, supra note 110 (arguing for expansion of Fourth Amendment protection);
for a full discussion of the history of the Fourth Amendment and Holtzman’s argument for expansion
see supra notes 110–117 and accompanying text.
229 See generally Terry, 392 U.S. 1 (holding stop and frisk violated Fourth Amendment rights of
individual due to invasion of person’s bodily integrity and dignity); see generally also Schmerber, 384 U.S.
757 (dissenting view arguing for invasion of privacy due to ‘unreasonable’ blood sample used as
evidence); for a full discussion of Terry and Schmerber see supra notes 110–117 and accompanying text.
230 See Holtzman, supra note 110, at 1956–75 (comparing and contrasting Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments’ interpretations of ‘right to privacy’); see supra notes 118–121 and accompanying text.
231 See generally Griswold, 381 U.S. 479 (holding right to privacy only exists in penumbras of Bill of
Rights and is a concept or personal liberty); see generally Roe, 410 U.S. 113 (following Griswold’s
interpretation of Fourteenth Amendment as only protecting individual personal liberty).
232 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 342 (Stevens, J. dissenting) (imploring majority to expand Fourteenth
Amendment to include invasions of human body covered by Fourth Amendment right to privacy).
233 See generally id. (expanding Fourteenth Amendment to protect against bodily invasion as Fourth
Amendment would make Due Process Clause more than a conduit for notions of personal liberty).
234 See generally id. (merging Fourteenth Amendment and Fourth Amendment would make Due
Process Clause more protective for citizens).
226
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2. Suspicion-based Testing
The law is silent on suspicion-based testing and the CAS has endorsed the
practice.235 However, the IOC stated that the practice of mass testing was found to be
a humiliating invasion of privacy.236 The IOC now has a practice of hand-selecting
women that “express male attributes” and then ‘out’ these women (typically exhibiting
DSDs) to the rest of the athlete community.237 This practice seems exponentially more
humiliating than across-the-board testing of all women or all athletes.238 Lastly, during
the actual testing process, athletes are kept in the dark about why the tests are being
administered.239 In Chand’s case, she was unaware of her DSD and was not told by
the medical professionals why she was being tested.240 It was only after the SAI
delivered Chand’s records to the AFI that she, and the entire Indian athletic
community, was informed of her diagnosis as hyperandrogenic.241 While there are not
any laws prohibiting this suspicion-based testing, the practices employed by the IAAF
and the IOC remain questionable.242
3. Discriminatory Effects
Both the transgender regulations and the hyperandrogenism regulations
proffered by the IAAF and adopted by the IOC only refer to women.243 The
transgender regulations only place restrictions on transgender women (an individual
who has undergone male-to-female sex reassignment surgery) because of the
competitive advantage she may have.244 A similar rationale exists for only placing
See generally Chand, CAS 2014/A/3759 (accepting and endorsing IOC’s use of suspicion-based
testing).
236 See Stacy Larson, Intersexuality and Gender Verification Tests: The Need to Assure Human Rights and
Privacy, 23 PACE INT’L L. REV. 215, 231–33 (2011) (discussing IOC’s progression through different
gender verification methods and stating that IOC abandoned most due to degrading nature).
237 See id. (clarifying that women modernly tested for gender verification must be recommended by
medical director of international sporting event and upon complaint due to suspicion); see generally
Chand, CAS 2014/A/3759 (explaining Chand’s experience during testing phase and her ‘outing’ to the
international sporting community as hyperandrogenic).
238 See generally Larson, supra note 236 (proposing appropriate testing methods and detailing contested
legal issues surrounding testing based on international law, human rights laws and groups, and IOC’s
historical battle with gender verification).
239 See generally Chand, CAS 2014/A/3759 (explaining Chand’s experience during testing phase and her
‘outing’ to the international sporting community as hyperandrogenic).
240 See generally id. (ignoring issue that athlete may not be aware why testing is occurring, as local sports
federations usually blame ‘doping’ suspicions).
241 See id. at 7 (excerpting SAI’s letter to AFI regarding Chand’s heightened androgen levels); see supra
notes 144–149 and accompanying text.
242 See generally Larson, supra note 236 (proposing appropriate testing methods and detailing contested
legal issues surrounding testing based on international law, human rights laws and groups, and IOC’s
historical battle with gender verification).
243 See INT’L OLYMPIC COMM., supra note 44 (stating that IOC Consensus Meeting recommends IOC
suspend IAAF’s Hyperandrogenism Regulations until resolution of Chand’s appeal or introduction of
new evidence by IAAF and excerpting IAAF’s Hyperandrogenism Regulations and providing excerpt
of Transgender Guidelines); for an excerpt of the Transgender Guidelines proffered by the IOC see
supra note 96 and accompanying text.
244 See INT’L OLYMPIC COMM., supra note 44 (providing explicitly that men are perceived to have
inherent athletic advantage so only male-to-female athletes are subject to regulations).
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restrictions on women with DSDs.245 A woman that over-produces testosterone and
other androgens is perceived to be an athletic threat to the other competitors.246
However, both the transgender and the hyperandrogenism regulations would both
violate even the narrow interpretation of Title VII under Ulane.247 Sex discrimination
under Ulane is the “unlawful . . . discriminat[ion] against women because they are
women.”248 Here, both regulations employed by the IOC are specifically targeted at
women because they are women that may have a competitive advantage.249 Men are
totally disregarded from both regulations.250
These regulations seem like by-the-book sex discrimination under Title VII.251
However, Hively and its progeny, including Macy, have expanded sex discrimination
over the years.252 Macy expanded sex discrimination to include gender identity
discrimination and Hively expanded it to include sexual orientation discrimination.253
Using the outcome determinative test of Hively, female athletes with higher
testosterone levels would be reexamined as males with higher testosterone levels and
would be able to compete in the Olympics.254 The expanded scope of Title VII,
therefore, would result in a violation of this law.255

See generally Chand, CAS 2014/A/3759 (holding male athletes have a competitive advantage over
female athletes and that female athletes with hyperandrogenism confer same male advantage due to
heightened testosterone levels).
246 See generally id. (holding that testosterone is indicator of athletic performance and advantage so
women with DSDs are inherently more competitive than other women).
247 See Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085 (“[I]t is unlawful to discriminate against women because they are
women and against men because they are men.”) (holding standard of sex discrimination is based on
whether discrimination occurred simply because of the sex of the individual).
248 Id. (setting sex discrimination standard narrowly so as to only apply to situations where
discrimination occurs explicitly due to individual’s sex).
249 See INT’L OLYMPIC COMM., supra note 44 (stating explicitly that women with DSDs have athletic
advantage over women without DSDs and that men have competitive advantage over women so only
male-to-female athletes must be regulated); see generally Chand, CAS 2014/A/3759 (holding male
athletes have a competitive advantage over female athletes and that female athletes with
hyperandrogenism confer same male advantage due to heightened testosterone levels); for an excerpt
of the Transgender Guidelines proffered by the IOC see supra note 96 and accompanying text.
250 See INT’L OLYMPIC COMM., supra note 44 (excluding men from testosterone checks and limitations
and excluding female-to-male athletes from regulations); see generally Chand, CAS 2014/A/3759
(disregarding discriminatory nature of both regulations); for an excerpt of the Transgender Guidelines
proffered by the IOC see supra note 96 and accompanying text.
251 See Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085 (“[I]t is unlawful to discriminate against women because they are
women and against men because they are men.”).
252 See generally Hively, 830 F.3d 698 (expanding sex discrimination using outcome determinative test
and including sexual orientation discrimination as sex discrimination).
253 See generally id. (holding sex discrimination includes sexual orientation discrimination); see generally
also Macy, 2012 WL 1435995 (holding sex discrimination includes gender identity discrimination).
254 See generally Hively, 830 F.3d 698 (using outcome determinative test).
255 See generally id. (using outcome determinative test); see generally also Macy, 2012 WL 1435995 (holding
sex discrimination includes gender identity discrimination).
245
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Hormone Ranges

This proposal maintains the hormone testing some athletes are currently
subject to while also incorporating elements from the first two proposals.256 The CAS
Panel’s reasoning for suspending the Hyperandrogenism Regulations focused partially
on the fact that no scientific evidence thus far proved testosterone a predictive factor,
but also on the discriminatory nature of the Hyperandrogenism Regulations.257 The
Regulations targeted women and only forced some women to undergo hormone
testing.258 Further, the testing was suspicion based, which means not every woman or
man undergoes testing indiscriminately.259 This proposal suggests indiscriminate
hormone testing among athletes with a division based on specific ranges of hormone
levels.260 This method of testing athletes across the board would eliminate some of
the disproportionate and discriminatory effects currently imposed on women
athletes.261
First, this proposal would impose mass testing on all athletes.262 While this still
does pose a constitutional and invasion of privacy issue, the testing procedures would
be applied to all athletes.263 Any kind of testing would pose a threat to invasion of
privacy; however, the testing would be disclosed, applicable to all athletes, and simply
a form of classification.264 The testing would not be done in order to disqualify athletes
or under the guise of doping as it is currently.265 Instead, the testing would be
completed in order to place athletes in a category commensurate with one’s athletic
ability and advantage.266 Further, the testing would be comparable to that done in
wrestling with weight classes, which has not raised constitutional issues.267 The entire
See Buzuvis, supra note 1, at 42–43 (discussing CAS’s, IOC’s, IAAF’s practice of suspicion-based
testing); for a full discussion on the other two proposals see supra notes 202–219 and accompanying
text.
257 See Chand, CAS 2014/A/3759 at 154–56 (listing Panel’s conclusions).
258 See id. (“There is, however, an assumption involved in the Hyperandrogenism Regulations as a
proportionate justification for discriminating between females.”).
259 See id. at 3–4 (discussing facts surrounding Chand’s initial medical testing, which arose when AFI
thought Chand was doping).
260 See infra notes 275–280 and accompanying text.
261 See generally Chand, CAS 2014/A/3759 (describing Chand’s contentions regarding IAAF’s
Hyperandrogenism Regulations including discriminatory impact on women athletes).
262 See generally Larson, supra note 236 (describing IOC’s intention to move away from mass testing
methods).
263 See generally Cruzan, 497 U.S. 261 (holding blood sample not invasion of privacy because use of
sample was not unreasonable action by state); for a full discussion on the history and applicability of
an individual’s right of privacy see supra notes 110–121 and accompanying text.
264 See generally Chand, CAS 2014/A/3759 (detailing Chand’s testing timeline, including her lack of
knowledge as to why testing was being administered).
265 See INT’L OLYMPIC COMM., supra note 44 (disqualifying from competition female-to-male athletes
and hyperandrogenic athletes that do not meet testosterone requirements).
266 For a discussion of the classes athletes would be separated into under this policy see infra notes
275–291 and accompanying text.
267 See PIAA Wrestling Weight Control Program Guidelines,
https://www.crsd.org/cms/lib5/PA01000188/Centricity/Domain/987/Wrestling_Weight_Program.
pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2017) (discussing full guidelines regarding wrestling weight classes, nutrition,
measurement process); see also NCAA, Wrestling Rules of the Game, NCAA
http://www.ncaa.org/championships/playing-rules/wrestling-rules-game (last visited Oct. 22, 2017)
(detailing guidelines, penalties, and rules book for NCAA wrestling).
256
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purpose behind the Hyperandrogenism Regulations and Transgender Guidelines was
to instill fairness in the Olympic Games.268 Under this proposal, all athletes would be
competing under the fairest rules possible.269
Second, this proposal would target all athletes competing in the Olympic
Games.270 Therefore, both males and females (including athletes that are intersex,
transgender, etc.) would be tested regardless of their gender identities, sexual
orientations, or sex.271 Under a Title VII analysis, this would completely negate any
sex discrimination issues raised by the current Hyperandrogenism Regulations and
Transgender Guidelines.272 Additionally, as stated above, the purpose of this testing
would be to place athletes in classes based on athletic advantage.273 Assuming
androgens do confer athletic advantage on individuals, this would create the most fair
athletic competition to date.274
This proposal of indiscriminate hormone testing works to incorporate the
second proposal mentioned earlier, androgen testing.275 Chand and her expert
witnesses suggested that androgens should be the hormone that is tested when
determining competitive advantage, as discussed in the previous section.276 If
androgens are the hormone that scientifically prove competitive advantage, then
separating athletes based on their androgen levels should be the most equal and
equitable way to divide competition categories (i.e., 1-9.99 nmol/L, 10-19.99 nmol/L,
etc.).277 This proposal would render moot any issues that could arise under the first
proposal in this section (gender identity) because athletes would no longer be separated
by gender, but instead, androgen levels.278 In fact, the legal issues associated with
gender identity would be moot for the same reason.279 Further, no discrimination
between men and women would occur under this proposal because all athletes would
be tested for their androgen levels and, thus, separated.280

See INT’L OLYMPIC COMM., supra note 44 (recommending that regulations be suspended due to
CAS decision but remaining steadfast in contention that regulations maintained fairness); see generally
also Chand, CAS 2014/A/3759 (holding regulations not inherently unfair as long as testosterone is
determinative hormone).
269 See generally Larson, supra note 236 (describing human rights organizations’ attempt to change IOC
policy to ensure more fair competition).
270 See supra note 262 and accompanying text.
271 See supra note 262 and accompanying text.
272 See generally Ulane, 742 F.2d 1081 (holding there must be discrimination and such discrimination
must be on account of one’s sex).
273 See generally Larson, supra note 236 (describing human rights organizations’ attempt to change IOC
policy to ensure more fair competition).
274 For a discussion of the classes athletes would be separated into under this policy see infra notes
275–291 and accompanying text.
275 See supra notes 214–219 and accompanying text for a discussion on hormone testing using
androgens as the measuring mechanism rather than testosterone.
276 See id.
277 See id.
278 See supra notes 202–208 and accompanying text.
279 For a discussion of legal issues associated with individuals changing his or her gender identity on
identification and other documents see supra notes 53–72 and accompanying text.
280 See supra notes 259–260 and accompanying text.
268
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To provide an easily cognizable example, wrestling categories shall be
employed.281 Wrestling, although typically a male sport, separates competing athletes
based on body weight.282 Athletes are required to weigh-in on the day of their
competition to confirm their current weight.283 Based on that number, the athletes are
separated into competition categories.284 While weight may not be an indicator of
athletic advantage in all sports, it provides wrestlers with a comparable and compatible
competitor.285 Levels of androgens (assuming androgens more closely resemble
athletic advantage over testosterone) would work in primarily the same fashion.286
Chand and her expert witnesses proposed that hyperandrogenic women athletes had
a 1-3% competitive advantage over women without DSDs and that assumed
approximately a 10 nmol/L gap.287 If each 10 nmol/L gap results in a similar
competitive advantage, there would be a significant gap between women without
DSDs and typical males (around 20 nmol/L).288 This proposal combats that advantage
by striking gender categories altogether and basing athletic competition ranges solely
on athletic advantage.289 Further, this proposal has utilized androgen testing as the
means for category separation.290 However, under the IAAF’s, IOC’s, CAS’s and
Chand’s reasoning, this proposal could simply be applied to testosterone and
implemented immediately.291

See PIAA Wrestling Weight Control Program Guidelines, supra note 267 (discussing full guidelines
regarding wrestling weight classes, nutrition, measurement process); see also NCAA, supra note 267
(detailing guidelines, penalties, and rules book for NCAA wrestling).
282 See PIAA Wrestling Weight Control Program Guidelines, supra note 267 (discussing full guidelines
regarding wrestling weight classes, nutrition, measurement process); see also NCAA, supra note 267
(detailing guidelines, penalties, and rules book for NCAA wrestling).
283 See Rule 9 § 2 Weigh-Ins, NCAA Wrestling 2017-18 and 2018-19 Rules and Interpretations,
http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/WR19.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2017)
(detailing procedure for day-of weigh-in).
284 See id. (detailing procedure for day-of weigh-in).
285 See generally id. (providing rationale for weight management and weight classification); see also PIAA
Wrestling Weight Control Program Guidelines, supra note 267 (providing rationale for weight management
and weight classification); see also NCAA, supra note 267 (providing rationale for weight management
and weight classification).
286 For another proposal suggesting androgens be the hormone determining competition categories
see supra notes 214–226 and accompanying text.
287 See Chand, CAS 2014/A/3759 at 155 (showcasing Panel’s reluctance to concede that excess
testosterone causes athletic advantage) (“The evidence does not, for example, establish an advantage
of the order of 12% rather than, say 1% to 3%.”).
288 For a full discussion regarding competitive advantage between men and women as well as between
hyperandrogenic women and women without DSDs see supra notes 187–201 and accompanying text.
289 See generally Chand, CAS 2014/A/3759 (describing IOC’s and IAAF’s emphasis on athletic
advantage as justification for hormone testing).
290 For another proposal suggesting androgens be the hormone determining competition categories
see supra notes 214–226 and accompanying text.
291 See generally Chand, CAS 2014/A/3759 (describing Chand’s contentions regarding IAAF’s
Hyperandrogenism Regulations including discriminatory impact on women athletes, IAAF’s steadfast
reliance on testosterone as predictor of competitive advantage, and CAS’s partial acceptance of
IAAF’s stance).
281
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CONCLUSION

This article provided insight into the recent predicament facing the Olympics:
gender determination. The Olympics have a long history of attempting to equally and
legally apply a gender standard across the board.292 Most recently, the IOC thought
they struck this balance with hormone testing, but hyperandrogenism proved a
difficult biological condition for which to account.293 With Chand’s appeal to the CAS
Panel and the forced suspension of the Hyperandrogenism Regulations, the IOC must
now reconsider a proper gender determination technique.294 Several scholars have
proposed methods for doing this, but the IOC has not yet decided how to proceed.295
The IAAF plans to return to the CAS with further evidence that testosterone-based
testing is valid, but the IOC continues its suspension of the Hyperandrogenism
Regulations in the meantime.296 Contentions and criticisms flow from most genderbased categorical separation and because of this, this article has detailed several
proposed solutions for the IOC.297 The last proposal – a total elimination of gender
categories – is a radical suggestion that meets the goals of all parties involved.298

See supra notes 74–109 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 92–109 and accompanying text.
294 See supra notes 150–161 and accompanying text.
295 For proposals suggested by scholars and author see supra notes 202–280 and accompanying text.
296 For full discussion regarding the IAAF’s new study and its planned return to the CAS see supra
notes 162–201 and accompanying text.
297 For full discussions on these proposed solutions see supra notes 202–291 and accompanying text.
298 For full discussion of last proposal see supra notes 256–280 and accompanying text.
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